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Do Announcements of Mergers and Acquisitions Create Value 
for Shareholders? Evidence from US Industrial Firms 
By 
Yasir Iqbal 
The twenty first century started with the sixth merger wave and a tremendous increase 
has been observed in the number of corporate mergers and acquisitions since 2003. This 
study investigates whether the announcements of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) create 
a value for shareholders or not. In order to study the effect of merger announcements, 
5337 M&A announcements in the US industrial firms between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2006 are considered. This study follows traditional event study 
methodology. Results indicate that the announcement of takeover or merger is taken as a 
positive signal by the market and stock prices of the firms involved increase to reflect the 
effect of announcement. The analysis points to positive abnormal returns realized for 
shareholders and provide enough evidence to support the assertion that merger 
announcements create a value to shareholders’ wealth. 
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Whether merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements create value for shareholders or 
not, is an ongoing debate for researchers. In today’s global world, the business 
environment has become extremely competitive. Companies are growing rapidly in the 
challenging environment to compete with their counterparts. In order to stay in business, 
companies have to be strong. Companies also need global presence for competition and 
growth and hence they are following various techniques to expand. Managers are seeking 
ways to create value for shareholders. One of the techniques a company uses to grow is 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Merger and acquisition announcements can create value for shareholders, but at the same 
time they can also dilute shareholders’ value. If markets react positively to a merger 
announcement, it would create value for shareholders. On the other hand, if markets react 
negatively to the announcement, it would lead to value destruction for stock holders. 
Value creation or destruction is reflected in the stock price. 
In recent years, mergers and acquisitions have become extremely important. A large 
number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has occurred over the period of last three 
decades around the globe. In 2012, the total value of worldwide M&A was US$ 2.3 
trillion, a 2.3% increase from 2011 (Thompson Reuters, 2012). In 2012, the total value of 
M&A activity involving the US totaled US$ 1.2 trillion (Thompson Reuters, 2012). 
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From an economic viewpoint, mergers are mainly divided into three different 
classifications; vertical mergers, horizontal mergers and conglomerate mergers. The first 
major type of mergers is horizontal mergers. A horizontal merger occurs between 
companies that share a similar kind of business activity and compete with each other. 
Mostly the main objective of horizontal merger is to enjoy economies of scale, but it 
could lead to a monopoly if it is not controlled by regulatory authorities. 
The second major type of mergers is vertical mergers. Vertical mergers involve firms that 
are at different stage of production activity. Different motivating factors behind vertical 
mergers involve market expansion, reducing costs and technological economies. Third 
main type of mergers is conglomerate mergers. Conglomerate mergers occur between 
firms that are in different type of business activities. 
There are three types of conglomerate mergers. The first type of conglomerate merger is 
a product extension merger, which involves extending the product line for the firm. 
Geographic market extension, also a conglomerate merger, involves expanding market 
operations geographically. A third type of merger is a pure conglomerate, and it includes 
mergers for unrelated business operations (Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin, 2003). 
Background 
Companies use merger and acquisition activities to enter new geographic regions or 
expand to new markets. Firms involve in M&A activities to enjoy the benefits of 
economies of scale or gain technological economies, management expertise, reducing 
cost and capital allocation. Despite a large number of studies on M&A activities, results 
are still unclear related to the value creation for shareholders. It is being argued that 
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synergy is created by M&A and value is created for both shareholders of the acquiring 
company and consumers (Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin, 2003). There is another 
school of thought who argues that M&A destroy value for shareholders, returns decrease 
due to agency problems (Jensen, 1986). One school of thought argues M&A create value 
for shareholders whereas opponents justify M&A activities destroy value; net results are 
unclear even after a number of researches. An ongoing research is needed to measure the 
net effect of M&A activities, whether M&A create or destroy value for shareholders. 
Cross border M&A are becoming more popular and increasing in number rapidly. In 
order to have global presence companies are merging or acquiring businesses across 
borders. The total value of cross border mergers and acquisitions is increasing 
considerably. US involvement in cross border M&A agreements is prominent. 
Purpose of Study 
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of merger and acquisition 
announcements on stock prices. Do mergers and acquisition announcements create value 
for shareholders? US industrial firms are used as a case study to answer the above 
mentioned question. Mergers and acquisition announcement during the period 2003 to 
2006 (Sixth merger wave) are analyzed. If the signal sent in the form of a merger and 
acquisition announcement is intercepted positively by the market, share prices go up and 
it creates value for shareholders, otherwise it can destroy value for shareholders. The 
announcement of merger or acquisition is considered an event. Markets react differently 




Importance of Study 
Industrial firms of United States are selected for this study after considering various 
important factors. The United States has one of the biggest economies in the world, and 
has a huge influence in the international market. Another important factor to consider is 
that the United States participates more in M&A activity than any other country. The 
reason for choosing an industrial sector is its importance in the US economy. 
Hypotheses 
H1. The average abnormal returns (AAR) around merger and acquisition announcements 
are positive for the securities. 
H2. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around merger and acquisition 
announcements are positive for the securities. 
Organization of Study 
This study is divided into five chapters. The current chapter gave a brief introduction to 
the reader about the research. Chapter two will contain a literature review related to the 
study. In Chapter three, data and methodology used for investigation of value creation in 
United States industrial firms by M&A announcements will be discussed. In Chapter 
four, empirical findings related to abnormal returns gained due to merger and acquisition 
announcement would be discussed. Finally, chapter five will conclude, discuss several 





There are a large number of studies revolving the debate that merger and acquisition 
announcements create or destroy the value for shareholders of both the bidding and target 
firms. There are researchers who favor the idea that merger and acquisition 
announcements led to excess returns for shareholders and there are also opponents who 
concluded that merger announcements did not lead to abnormal returns. 
Event Study 
In finance, the traditional event study methodology has been used to examine the impact 
of financial and/or non-financial events on the stock returns of securities. Many reviews 
are available on financial event study in literature. MacKinlay (1979) and Serra (2002) 
worked on event study methodology and provided scholarly reviews on event study 
methodology and techniques. Cox and Portes (1998) studied the uses and abuses of event 
study and provided a comprehensive summary of event study in merger and acquisition 
announcements. Pautler (2003) also studied and explained the use of financial event 
study methodology for merger and acquisition. 
Researchers also studied post performance of securities in short run and long run after 
merger and acquisition announcements. Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) carried out a 
comprehensive study on post-merger performance of stocks. Langetieg (1978) studied 
long term post-merger and acquisition performance and found negative cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CAR) between 2.23% and 2.62% over a period of 6 years after merger 
and acquisition. 
Merger and acquisition announcements 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) studied M&A announcements and analyzed abnormal returns 
gained around M&A announcements. Their study determined that successful takeovers 
lead to positive and significant returns for shareholders, of both the bidding and the target 
firms. This leads to the conclusion that merger and acquisition activities create a value for 
shareholders. 
Langetieg (1978) analyzed M&A announcements and measured the gains for 
shareholders from mergers. M&A announcements create value and cause significant and 
excessive post-merger returns for shareholders (Langetieg, 1978). 
Asquith and Kim (1982) studied abnormal returns gained by shareholders of target firms 
due to announcements of mergers and acquisitions or completion of mergers. Asquith et 
al. (1982) concluded that stock holders of the target firms gained positive results from 
M&A activity while stock holders of the bidding firms did not see the same positive 
results. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) analyzed work of thirteen researches on significant positive 
gains due to merger and acquisition announcements. There results indicated that 
abnormal gains for shareholders of the target firm are twenty percent for mergers. Stock 
holders of bidding firms enjoyed four percent abnormal gains for the successful tender 
offers and no abnormal gains for mergers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
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Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) studied the results of merger announcements on stock 
holders’ returns, but they did not find evidence to support that merger announcements led 
to abnormal returns over the period of three years after the announcement date. They 
concluded that merger and acquisition activities did not create value for shareholders of 
the bidding firms. 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) investigated abnormal gains around merger 
announcements. They found that stock holders of bidding firms lost value due to M&A 
transactions. Their study showed that merger and acquisition activities failed to give 
abnormal returns of shareholders of bidding firms; in fact, M&A transactions destroyed 
value. 
Wong and Cheung (2009) studied market reaction to takeovers in Asia during the period 
2000 – 2007. Their findings indicate that markets reacted negatively to takeover activities 
and M&A transactions destroyed value for shareholders of target firms. They concluded 
that Asian markets did not favor mergers for shareholders of target firms. 
Studies show that there are various economic motives behind merger and acquisition 
activities. Acquiring firm for a profitable investment is one of the most common reasons 
for acquisitions in the literature. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) studied motives behind 
merger activities and found that the most common motive is the alternative form of 
profitable investment. Firms go for acquisition when they find merger and acquisition 
activity as a profitable form of alternative investment. 
Firms use mergers and acquisitions to combine their business operations. Firms generally 
combine their assets to enhance output, reduce operational costs, gain new technologies, 
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improve product quality, or production of a totally new product. Firms become involved 
in merger and acquisition activities to enjoy efficiencies. Managerial efficiencies, 
financial efficiencies and operational are the common forms of efficiencies achieved 
through mergers and acquisitions. 
Management does not always use acquisition for reducing cost or short term goals; it also 
involves in merger activity for certain long term goals. Firms use M&A transactions to 
achieve specific long term goals which are part of the firm’s strategic plan (Scheffman, 
2003). 
A large volume of academic research has been conducted to find out some strategy to 
gain abnormal returns over a long term, in which most researchers have concluded that 
abnormal returns could be gained in the short term but not in the long term. The field of 
information technology has highly progressed and information spreads quickly, 
disallowing for many to enjoy abnormal returns over a period of long term. 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
According to efficient market hypothesis (EMH), financial markets are efficient. Stock 
prices incorporate and reflect all the relevant financial and non-financial information, 
making it is impossible to beat the market for a longer period of time. According to 
EMH, stocks trade at their fair value. Efficient market hypothesis is classified into three 
levels: 
1. Weak form EMH 
2. Semi-strong form EMH 
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3. Strong form EMH 
The concept of EMH has always been controversial among academic researchers. Jensen 
(1978) studied the stock price behavior and concluded that it is impossible to earn 
abnormal returns based on the information set when a market is efficient. No investor can 
enjoy abnormal profits by trading based on the information set.  
Reilly and Brown (1997) argued that stock prices would take no time to adjust to new 
information. Stock prices reflect all the information available, markets are efficient, and 
impossible to beat the market based on information (Reilly and Brown, 1997). 
Merger waves 
Merger and acquisition activities in the US industrial history are classified into six 
merger waves. The great six merger waves are: 
1) First wave (1890s) 
2) Second wave (1920s) 
3) Third wave (1960s) 
4) Fourth wave (1980s) 
5) Fifth wave (1990s) 
6) Sixth and last wave (2000s) 
The last wave includes merger and acquisition announcements between 2003 and 2008. 
Numerous aspects of sixth merger wave include private equity, leveraged buyout and 




Data and Methodology 
Data Description 
To determine whether merger and acquisition announcements create or destroy value for 
shareholders, data for the period between 2003 and 2006 is gathered. The United States 
industrial firms are the focus of this study. Data for merger and acquisition 
announcements is gathered from the Securities Data Company (SDC). Data for daily 
stock prices and benchmark is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database for the period 2003 to 2006. During the period of January 01, 2003 until 
December 31, 2006, 5337 mergers and acquisition announcements were identified that 
meet the following criteria: 
1) All the acquiring firms are publically listed 
2) Target firms could be public, private or subsidiary 
3) The acquirer contains 100% of the target firm after the acquisition 
4) Sample considers acquiring firms from US industrial sector  
5) The value of a deal is more than $100 million as disclosed in SDC 
6) Financial information of the acquiring firm is available from Compustat 
7) Daily stock price data of the acquiring firm is available from Center for Research 





The rationale for choosing the period (2003 – 06) is the fact that recent merger wave 
(Sixth merger wave) started in 2003. This study analyzes the data for the period 2003-
2006. The data for the 2007-08 financial crises is somewhat inefficient and polluted. Data 
for the period of 2003 to 2006 is efficient enough to make a reasonable conclusion about 
whether merger and acquisition announcements create value for shareholders or not. 
Methodology 
Event study methodology is most commonly used to calculate abnormal returns for a 
merger and acquisition event. The choice of an asset pricing model is very crucial to 
determine abnormal returns. Scale of abnormal returns depends on the selection of a 
pricing model to a large extent. In order to determine whether merger and acquisition 
announcements create or destroy value for shareholders, stock price behavior of firms is 
studied around takeover period (Brown and Warner, 1985). This stock price behavior of 
bidding firms would be determined by abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for securities in the event window using the market model. Positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) indicate that the merger and acquisition 
announcements create value for shareholders and a negative CAR indicate that 
announcements destroy value for shareholders. In order to calculate AAR and CAR, 
following items need to be defined: 
 Event date 




 Estimation Period 
Event Date 
Event date is date firms announce mergers and acquisitions, not the date they actually 
acquire. Taking the actual acquiring date would not give meaningful results, since many 
changes take place after the announcement date. The day firm publically announces its 
merger and acquisition plan, is taken as the event date (Bowman, 1983). 
Event Window 
The event window is the time period analyzed to calculate abnormal returns (AR) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all securities under study. In this study,   two 
event windows are used. The first event window consists of 11 day and the second 21 
days. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated over the period of 11 days as event window 
or time frame first and then 21 days. These 11 days consist of five days before event date 
and five days after the announcement date. Interpretation of abnormal returns of a 
bidding firm could also depend on other factors and event window. The cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are also calculated for both the event windows. 
Benchmark 
There are a large number of models to calculate abnormal returns. Abnormal return is the 
difference between actual return and benchmark return or normal return. In this study 
CRSP value weighted index returns are used as benchmark for abnormal returns. 
Benchmark is used to calculate normal or expected returns and then abnormal returns are 




Estimation period is the period in which the parameters for the benchmark are estimated. 
Researchers have used different estimation periods. In this research paper, an estimation 
period of -30 to -120 days will be used.  
Market Model 
The choice of an asset pricing model is very crucial to determine abnormal returns. Scale 
of abnormal returns depends on the selection of pricing model to a large extent. In this 
study, the market model is used to determine abnormal returns for securities. The market 
model used to determine the linear relationship between security returns and returns on 
market portfolio is given in the following formula: 
Ry,t =  αy +  βyRm,t + εy,t 
Ry,t= the daily rate of return on security y on the day t 
Rm,t= the daily rate of on market index on day t 
βy = a covariance between Ryt and Rmt divided by a variance of Rmt 
αy= intercept for security y 
Ԑy,t= model error term on security y on day t, expected value of model error term is zero 
The daily rates of return for each security are calculated from closing stock prices by 
following formulas: 




 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡−1 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡−1
 
Ri,t = the rate of return on security I on day t 
Pi,t = the closing price on security I on day t 
Pi,t-1 = the closing price on security I on day t-1 
The daily rates of return for market index are calculated from closing values of market 
index by following formulas: 
𝑅𝑚 ,𝑡 =
 𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡−1 
𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡−1
 
Rm,t = the rate of return on market m on day t 
Pm,t = the closing market index on day t 
Pmt-1 = the closing market index on day t-1 
Abnormal returns are the excess returns, the difference between estimated expected 
returns and actual returns. Abnormal returns are calculated by following relationship: 
𝐴𝑅𝑦 ,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑦 ,𝑡 −  ( 𝛼𝑦 +  𝛽𝑦𝑅𝑚 ,𝑡) 
ARy,t = Abnormal return of security y on day t 
Ry,t = actual daily return of security y on day t 
αy and βy are estimated parameters 
. . . . . . . . . (2) 
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The average abnormal return (AAR) for all securities is calculated by aggregating 
abnormal returns of all securities on day t and dividing by the number of firms. AAR is 








In order to determine whether merger and acquisition announcements create value for 
shareholders or not, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACAR) are also calculated. If CAR is greater is than zero for securities 
for the event window, it reflects that merger announcements create value for 
shareholders. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using formula: 
CARy,t =  CARy,t−1 +  ARy,t  









H0: AARt = 0 
H1: AARt≠ 0 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: ACARt = 0 
H1: ACAR t≠ 0  
. . . . . . . . . (3) 
. . . . . . . . . (4) 





In order to calculate abnormal returns two event windows are considered in this study. 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) at the 
announcement and around announcement date in an event window indicate how markets 
react to the announcement. If markets react positively, stock prices for securities will 
climb. Positive and significant average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) during the event window for securities show that merger and 
acquisition announcements create value for shareholders. The statistical significance of 
results is also tested.  
Event Window [-5, +5] 
The results show that for the period 2003 - 06, merger and acquisition announcements in 
the US industrial firms created positive abnormal returns (AR). For the event window of 
11 days [-5, +5], average abnormal returns (AAR) of .42% support the hypothesis that 
merger and acquisition announcements create value for shareholders. The event window 
of 11 days means five days before and five days after the announcement. Positive 
abnormal returns at the day of an announcement also supports that the US market is at the 




Positive and significant average abnormal returns (AAR) are found on the event date (the 
announcement date) and around the event date in the event window. 
 
The graph below shows that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for merger 
announcements in the event window of 11 days are positive. Positive cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) show that merger and acquisition announcements created value 
































The statistical significance of the results is also tested. 
 
Event Window [-10, +10] 
For the event window of 11 days [-5, 0, +5], positive average abnormal returns (AAR) of 
.44% support the hypothesis that merger and acquisition announcements create value for 
shareholders. Positive and significant average abnormal returns (AAR) are found on the 




The significance of AAR is also tested and shown below. Positive and significant average 
abnormal returns (AAR) are found on the event date (the announcement date) and around 
the event date in the event window. 
 
The graph shows that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for merger announcements in 































returns of .44%. Positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) show that merger and 
acquisition announcements created value for stock holders during the period 2003 - 06.  
 






Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
This study examined the stock price behavior of acquiring firms around merger and 
acquisition announcements between 2003 and 2006. In order to investigate the price run-
up around announcements, an event study was conducted. The focus was on short-term 
abnormal returns gained from merger announcements in the US industrial firms. The 
event study was conducted using two event windows.  The results of the study indicated 
that stock price show an uptrend on mergers’ announcement, resulting in positive returns 
for the security. 
The first event window [-5, +5], presents positive abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement. Positive average abnormal returns (AAR) are .43% around announcement 
and results are statistically significant. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are also 
positive and significant for the time frame. The second event window [-10, 10] shows a 
positive and statistically significant AAR of .44%. The cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are also positive and significant for the time frame of 21 days.  
In general, the behavior of average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) is found positive and in accordance with the expectation. The results 
support the hypotheses that AAR and CAR are positive, and enough evidence is found to 
conclude that the US stock market is semi-strong form efficient and announcements of 




Several recommendations and limitations came into factor while performing and 
analyzing the study. One limitation of this study is that data is taken for industrial firms 
only; announcements could have different reactions in other sectors. Another limitation is 
the time period; impact will be different after the financial crisis 2007-08. An increase in 
the event window and estimation window will catch more factors. Taking more sectors 
and time period into consideration in the future, this study can be enhanced to determine 
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set more off 
set memory 5g 
use acq_dates1979_2006, clear 
gen year=year(date_announce) 
keep if year>=2003& year<=2006 
sortipermdate_announce 
tempfile acq_dates2003_2006 
quietly save `acq_dates2003_2006', replace 
bysortiperm: gen eventcount=_N 
 




quietly save `eventcount', replace 
clear 
 
use crsp_data2003_2006.dta, clear 
gen year=year(date) 





quietly save `crsp_data2003_2006', replace 
sortiperm 
mergeiperm using `eventcount' 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 




byiperm date: gen set=_n 
sortiperm set 
tempfile crsp_data2003_2006_new 
quietly save `crsp_data2003_2006_new', replace 
use `acq_dates2003_2006', clear 
byiperm: gen set=_n 
sortiperm set 
tempfile acq_dates2003_2006_new 
quietly save `acq_dates2003_2006_new', replace 
use `crsp_data2003_2006_new', clear 





egencompany_id = group(iperm set) 
sortcompany_id date 
bycompany_id: gen datenum=_n 




bycompany_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-5 &dif<=5 
egencount_event_obs=count(event_window), by(company_id) 
bycompany_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30 &dif>=-120 
egencount_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replaceevent_window=0 if event_window==. 
replaceestimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
drop if count_event_obs<11 
drop if count_est_obs<30 
drop if estimation_window==0 &event_window==0 
************************************************************************ 
*Step 2: Estimating Normal Performance using a Market Model 
************************************************************************ 
genpredicted_return=. 
egen id=group(company_id)  






while `i'<=id_N {  
 display "Estimating normal performance for firm: " `i' 
 quietlyregretnvwretd if id==`i' &estimation_window==1  
 predictp`i' if id==`i' 
 replacepredicted_return=p`i' if id==`i' &event_window==1  
 dropp`i' 
 locali=`i'+1 
}   
************************************************************************ 
*Step 3: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
************************************************************************
sort id date 
genabnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egencumulative_abnormal_return=sum(abnormal_return)  
by id: egenaverage_abnormal_return=mean(abnormal_return) 
************************************************************************ 
*Step 4: Testing for Significance 
************************************************************************ 
sort id date 
by id: egenar_sd = sd(abnormal_return)  
gen test =(1/11)*(cumulative_abnormal_return/ar_sd)  
29 
 
gen test =(1/11)*(average_abnormal_return/ar_sd) 
************************************************************************
*Step 5: Testing Across All Events 
************************************************************************ 
regcumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
regaverage_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
 
preserve 
collapse (mean) cumulative_abnormal_return, by(diff) 
twoway scatter cumulative_abnormal_return diff if diff>=-5 & diff<=5, xlab(-10(1)10) 
c(l) xline(-1) xline(0) xline(1) 
restore 
